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By applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), this study examines the efficiency of 
a subset of Norwegian bus companies in order to test the hypothesis that public 
companies are less efficient than private ones. DEA consists of constructing a 
piecewise linear best practice frontier enveloping the input-output combinations of the 
companies, efficiency being measured for each individual company in terms of its 
distance relative to the frontier. DEA is widely acclaimed for being flexible, letting 
the data reveal the unknown and possibly complex relationships between inputs and 
outputs. As a consequence, each company is most likely evaluated against similar 
companies being located in the ‘neighbourhood’ in the input-output space. If private 
and public companies are clustered in separate subspaces in the input-output space 
however, each company will most likely be evaluated against companies of its own 
rather than the opposite category of ownership. In order to avoid this pitfall, we 
identify and include in the study only those companies that are found to be either 
efficient or inefficient as compared to at least one company in the opposite category 
of ownership. The results from the study are compared to those obtained by the more 
conventional approach where all companies are included in the study. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The property rights theory claims that as compared to private ownership, public 
ownership has disadvantageous effects on the incentives for managers and employees 
to fulfil the objectives set out by their principals.1 Private companies should thus 
outperform public companies in terms of efficiency. Several empirical studies have 
been carried out in order to reveal whether this is true or not. The findings are rather 
mixed however. Borcherding et al (1982) in their widely quoted survey, concluded 
that the literature seems to indicate that private companies are more cost effective than 
their public counterparts, but that these differences accrue to differences in 
competition rather than ownership per se. Vining & Boardman (1992) on the other 
hand, claim that private companies outperform public companies even if competition 
is controlled for. Thus, the literature is inconclusive. 
 
One of the industries that have been subject to examination, is the bus industry. In 
their reviews, both Perry et al (1988) and Berechman (1993) reaches conclusions 
similar to Borcherding et al (1982). The results from more recent studies are also 
mixed. For instance, Chang & Kao (1992) and Kerstens (1996) found that private bus 
operators outperformed public bus operators in Taiwan and France respectively. 
Cowie & Asenova (1999) reach the same conclusion in their study of British bus 
companies. Viton (1997) in his study of the US bus industry on the other hand, found 
no difference between private and public companies regarding efficiency. The latter 
results is confirmed by Jørgensen et al (1997) and by Odeck & Alkadi (forthcoming) 
in their studies of the Norwegian bus industry. 
 
Except for Jørgensen et al (1997) (estimating a stochastic cost frontier), the more 
recent studies referred to above share a common feature in that they all apply Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA involves the construction of a piecewise linear 
best practice production frontier enveloping the data in the input-output space. The 
efficiency of each individual company is measured in terms of the relative distance to 
this best practice production frontier. The property rights theory is tested for by means 
                                                          
1 See Furubotn and Pejovich (1974) for a review of the property rights theory. 
of some statistical test (eg. Mann-Whitney rank test) comparing the efficiency scores 
of private and public companies. 
 
One major reason for applying DEA is that the method is quite flexible, letting the 
data to a large extent reveal the possibly complex relationships between inputs and 
outputs. As a consequence, each company is most likely compared to similar 
companies being located in the ‘neighbourhood’ in the input-output space. If private 
and public companies are clustered in separate subspaces in the input-output space 
however, each company will most likely be compared to companies of its own rather 
than the opposite ownership category. In other words, comparisons of efficiency are 
made within rather than across the two categories of ownership. In such cases, 
comparisons of relative efficiency between private and public companies are at best 
dubious. The previous papers applying DEA in order to test for the significance of 
ownership in the bus industry do all ignore this possible pitfall. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to reconsider the issue of ownership in the bus industry, making sure that 
comparisons among bus companies are made between rather than within the two 
categories of ownership. 
 
In section 2 we discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis that public 
companies are less efficient than their public counterparts. In the subsequent section, 
section 3, we give a short presentation of efficiency measurement by means of DEA. 
In section 4 we discuss more thoroughly the problem of making comparisons between 
private and public companies if the two categories are clustered in separate subspaces 
in the input-output space. In section 5 we present a method that enables us to detect 
those companies that are either efficient or inefficient as compared to companies of 
the opposite category of ownership. In section 6 we present a data set for the 
Norwegian bus industry to which this method is applied in section 7 in order to test 
the significance of ownership. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Why should ownership matter? 
 
In economics, it is assumed that agents are rational, utility-maximising agents. In 
addition, it is quite common to assume that agents will pursue their own personal 
goals. This has serious implications for the relationship between employers and 
employees amongst others. If the personal goals of the management or the employees 
differ from the objectives of the company in which they are employed, they will act 
according to their own personal goals if given the opportunity. Asymmetric 
information provides such an opportunity. This is a central theme within the theory of 
principal-agent.2 
 
The property rights theory argues that incentive problems are particularly severe in 
public companies. To see how, suppose that employees in a public company enjoys ‘a 
quiet life’ (eg. Migue & Belanger, 1974) that leads to cost- or X-inefficiency. This 
would ultimately lead to a loss of profits or alternatively an increase in the need for 
public subsidies. In both cases, this would eventually cause an increase in the tax bill 
to be paid by the public. Of course, as the employees in the company pay taxes as 
well, they will be adversely affected themselves. But as the number of taxpayers is 
quite substantial, their share of the tax bill will be quite small or even negligible. 
Thus, the employees reap the positive consequences of pursuing their own personal 
goals while the negative consequences are carried mainly by the remaining part of the 
public. As a consequence, employees in a public company will have weak or no 
incentives to abstain from a ‘quiet life’ or other personal goals they may have. 
 
Although incentive problems are expected to be present in private companies as well, 
the property rights theory argue that the incentive problems are more severe in public 
companies, implicitly promoting privatisation of public companies. A major argument 
is that private ownership allows the managers of and the employees in a private 
company to own a substantial share of the company in which they are employed. The 
ownership of a public company on the other hand, is dispersed on the public or the 
citizens. To see the importance of this, suppose that the managers and employees of a 
company enjoy ‘a quiet life’ at work, thereby decreasing profits. If the management 
and the employees own a substantial share of the company however, they will carry a 
substantial share of the costs associated with their ‘quiet life’. As a consequence, 
employees in a private company may have strong incentives to abstain from pursuing 
their own personal goals. As already noted, this is precluded in the case of public 
ownership, but not in the case of private ownership. 
                                                          
2 For an introduction to the theory of principal-agent, see for instance Arrow (1986). 
 Even though private ownership allows employees to own a substantial share of the 
company in which they are employed, this is by no means the rule. According to 
advocates of private ownership, we may still expect private ownership to be superior 
to public ownership. One reason is that private ownership makes concentrated 
ownership possible. Since the owner or the owners reap all the gains from making 
sure that the firm is efficiently run, they have strong incentives to monitor the firm. In 
the case of public ownership however, ownership is dispersed as the ultimate owners 
are the general public. Thus, the gains from monitoring are dispersed as well. Since 
monitoring presumably involve non-negligible costs, each citizen will probably not 
find it worthwhile to monitor. And even worse; each citizen will have an incentive to 
free-ride. Hence, the incentives to monitor publicly owned firms are weak and 
possibly non-existent as compared to private firms with concentrated ownership 
(Alchian, 1965). 
 
The above arguments have been contradicted however. Concerning the advantages of 
management or employee ownership, Holmstrom (1982) argue that common 
ownership among the managers and employees may give rise to free rider problems, 
causing weak and possibly no incentives for managers and employees to abstain from 
pursuing their own goals. Concerning the advantages of concentrated ownership for 
monitoring, a significant share of private firms are public in the sense that there are 
many owners, each with a small stake or share in the firm. Although such an 
ownership structure is efficient by means of risk sharing, each owner’s incentive to 
monitor is weak or possibly even absent as in the case of public ownership. Advocates 
of private ownership have responded to this by arguing that the monitoring need not 
come from the owners. Since the ownership of privately owned firms may be 
transferred, there may be investors or raiders searching for inefficient firms in order to 
take over the firms, ensuring that they are efficiently run, thereby increasing the 
stockprice in order to make profits. The threat of such take-overs may discipline the 
managers and the employees to be efficient. Grossman & Hart (1980) on the other 
hand, argue that the threat of take-over may be empty due to free-rider problems: By 
not selling its shares, a shareowner will reap the gains from the raid at no cost. Hence, 
they will not sell at a lower price than the expected ‘post-raid’ stockprice. In that case, 
there is nothing to gain for raiders and the threat of take-over is empty. Even if the 
threat of take over is non-empty as argued by others, the threat of a take over may not 
be empty for a public firm either as long as privatisation is an option. The threat of 
privatisation may therefore discipline employees in public firms to be efficient as the 
threat of take over of private firms may discipline employees in private firms to be 
efficient. 
  
As is evident from the discussion above, it is not obvious that private firms are more 
efficient than public firms. This calls for empirical tests in order to reveal whether 
public ownership is inferior to private ownership or not. With regard to this, recall 
that the property rights theory claims that as compared to private ownership, public 
ownership has disadvantageous effects on the incentives for managers and employees 
to fulfil the objectives set out by their owners. Thus, if one is to make a proper test of 
the property rights theory, the performance of each company should be compared to 
the objectives for that particular company. For private companies, the owners are 
presumably requesting maximum profits. Although economists commend that public 
companies should strive for economic efficiency, the public choice theory argues 
forcefully that one can hardly expect this to be the case in practice.3 Unfortunately, 
the public choice theorists have not come up with a generally accepted theory 
regarding what objectives to expect in practice. As a consequence, one is forced to 
refrain from evaluating each company’s capability to fulfil its superior goals.  
 
The solution to this problem is to focus on subgoals that are unambiguous for both 
kinds of ownership. Cost minimisation might be a candidate in this respect. There are 
several reasons why this should not be favoured as a measure of relative efficiency 
however. For instance, if combating unemployment is one of the main goals of the 
public authorities, a public company might be instructed to employ a larger staff than 
what is strictly cost minimising. In that case, such a company would be considered 
inefficient despite the fact that it actually fulfils the main objectives set by its 
principals.4 Therefore, we are in line with Pestieau & Tulkens (1990) suggestomg that 
such comparisons should be based on technical efficiency as technical efficiency is 
                                                          
3 For a review of the public choice theory, see Mueller (1989). 
4 Despite this, comparisons of costs where quite common in the earlier literature dealing with 
comparisons of private and public ownership. 
presumably a common subgoal for both public and private companies. Measuring 
technical efficiency by means of DEA is the subject in the subsequent section. 
 
3 Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
A company is said to be technically efficient if it is impossible to increase any output 
and/or decrease any input without simultaneously reducing at least one other output 
and/or increasing at least one other input (Koopmans, 1951). Debreu (1951) offered a 
measure of technical efficiency being one minus the maximum proportional reduction 
in all inputs consistent with continued production of existing outputs. Farrell (1957) 
suggested that the Debreu (1951) measure of technical efficiency could easily be 
computed as an index or ratio: Let zk be the vector of inputs for DMU k and zk* a 
second vector of inputs such that zk* = θkzk where θk is a scalar. Further, let yk be the 
vector of outputs for DMU k and yk* a second vector of outputs associated with zk*. 
The measure of technical efficiency is defined as the minimal value that θk can attain 
provided that yk* ≥ yk. As 0 < zk* ≤ zk, it follows that 0 < θk ≤ 1. DMU k is 
technically efficient if θk = 1, otherwise (that is; 0 < θk < 1) it is inefficient. The lower 
the value of θk, the less efficient is DMU k. 
 
According to the definition in Koopmans (1951) however, technical efficiency might 
just as well be measured in terms of the maximum proportional increase in all outputs 
consistent with existing inputs: Let μk be such that y* = μkyk. The measure of 
technical efficiency is defined as the maximum value that μk can attain provided that 
z* ≤ zk. As yk* ≥ yk, it follows that μk ≥ 1. DMU k is technically efficient if μk = 1, 
otherwise (that is; μk > 1) it is inefficient. The higher the value of μk, the less efficient 
is DMU k. This latter measure of efficiency is termed the output-increasing measure 
of technical efficiency, while the former is termed the input-saving (or –decreasing) 
measure of technical efficiency. 
 
In order to evaluate the technical efficiency of companies, we need to know the 
maximum output that can be generated from a given input or alternatively, the 
minimum input required to produce a given output. In more technical terms, we need 
to know the frontier of the production possibility set. Such information is rarely 
available however. As a consequence, it is common to construct a so-called best 
practice frontier based on available data, representing the technically most efficient 
production practices to be found in practice. As a consequence of this, some of the 
companies will necessarily be on the best practice frontier. Such companies are 
termed best practice efficient and obtain efficiency scores equal to unity. 
 
Several methods have been proposed and applied in order to obtain best practice 
frontiers. One option is to assume that the production possibility set may be 
represented by a parametric production function, e.g. Cobb-Douglas. This allows one 
to estimate the best practice production frontier by means of well-established 
econometric methods. However, parametric production functions may be too 
restrictive, not least if flexible functional forms are prohibited due to data limitations.  
This calls for applying a so-called non-parametric frontier analysis, amongst which 
the data envelopment analysis or DEA has gained considerable popularity in recent 
years. DEA is acclaimed for resting on rather weak assumptions concerning the 
properties of the production technology, thus letting the data to a large extent reveal 
the possibly complex relationship between inputs and outputs. More specifically, 
DEA consists of enveloping the input-output observations by a piecewise linear 
frontier. Although the method allows multiple for outputs as well as multiple inputs, 
figure 1 illustrates a DEA frontier for a single input – single output case, z measuring 
the quantity of input, y the quantity of output while A, B, C etc. are input-output 
combinations for the companies to be evaluated.  
 
The input-saving and output-increasing measures of technical efficiency can be 
illustrated by means of figure 1. Consider company B whose quantities of input and 
output is zB and yB respectively. The minimum quantity of input associated with 
producing at least yB, is z*B. Thus, the input-saving measure of technical efficiency is 
z*B/zB. The maximum quantity of output that is attainable with the quantity zB of 
inputs, is y*B. Thus, the output-increasing measure of technical efficiency is y*B/yB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 
 
The idea to envelop the data by linear facets was pioneered by Farrell (1957). 
However, the method did not gain ground until Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
ingeniously applied linear programming techniques in order to jointly calculate the 
efficiency measures and the relevant part of the frontier for each company (or more 
generally; Decision Making Unit) in turn. This is the method that has come to be 
known as DEA. Although their study was restricted to constant returns to scale, the 
methodology has been generalised by Bankers, Charnes and Cooper (1984) to handle 
variable returns to scale as is the case illustrated in figure 1. As the latter is more 
flexible than the former, we concentrate on the latter model for which input-saving 
measures of technical efficiency may be obtained by computing the following linear 
programming problem for each individual company: 
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where N = 1,..,n is the total number of companies, θk is the Farrell input-saving 
measure of technical efficiency for company k, zi is the vector of actual inputs used by 
company i, yi is the vector of actual production of company i, while  λ1, ..., λn are 
scalar weights to be optimised. (2.2) guarantees that the technical efficient input 
combination θkzk is technically feasible, while (2.3) guarantees that production does 
not fall short of the actual output yk. (2.4) merely restricts the weights to be positive, 
while (2.5) determines the scale properties, in this case variables returns to scale. The 
output-increasing measures of technical efficiency may be obtained by computing the 
following linear programming problem for each individual company: 
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where μk is the Farrell output-increasing measure of technical efficiency for company 
k. (3.7) – (3.10) corresponds to (3.2) – (3.5). A thorough introduction to the various 
DEA models can be found in Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000). 
 
4 The relative efficiency of private and public companies? 
 
Conventionally, applying DEA in order to evaluate the relative efficiency of private 
and public companies comprises two steps. In the first step, efficiency measures for 
each individual company are obtained by means of DEA. In the second step, statistical 
analysis (eg. Mann-Whitney rank test) is applied in order to test whether there are 
significant differences in average efficiency between private and public companies. 
For instance, suppose that in the example depicted in figure 1, A, B and C are all 
public companies whereas D, E and F are all private companies. Suppose further that 
input-saving measures of efficiency are obtained for each company. In that case, A, C, 
E and F would turn out to be best practice efficient, whereas B and E would turn out 
to be almost equally inefficient. Thus, both categories contains two efficient 
companies and one equally inefficient company. Although such a sample would be far 
too small for obtaining statistically significant results, it may still seem reasonable to 
conclude that private and public companies tends to be equally efficient. 
 
However, such a conclusion may be hasty. To see why, note that as DEA is quite 
flexible, each company tends to be compared to rather similar companies located in 
the ‘neighbourhood’ in the input-output space. For instance, B is evaluated against a 
linear combination of its ‘neighbours’ A and C while E is evaluated against a linear 
combination of its ‘neighbours’ D and F. Now, as A and C are public companies, the 
public company B is in effect evaluated against public companies. Correspondingly, 
the private company E is evaluated against the private companies D and F. Thus, as 
the two categories of companies are clustered in separate subspaces in the input-
output space, each company tends to be evaluated against companies of the same 
rather than the opposite category of ownership. In such circumstances, making 
statistical inferences concerning the importance of ownership for efficiency seems 
dubious. To see why, suppose for the moment that there existed private companies G 
and H and public companies I and J producing at scales comparable to that of the 
public and private companies respectively. Such a situation is depicted in figure 2. As 
can be seen from the figure, the private companies D, E, F, G and H are all best 
practice efficient except for E. The public companies A, B, C, I and J on the other 
hand, are all being inefficient. Although such a sample would be too small for 
obtaining statistically significant results, it may still seem reasonable to conclude that 
public companies tends to be less efficient that their private counterparts.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
As can be seen by comparing the two examples as depicted in figure 1 and 2, 
clustering of private and public companies in separate subspaces in the input-output 
space may have severe effects on the conclusions concerning the importance of 
ownership for efficiency. Thus, if clustering is present, then making statistical 
inferences concerning the importance of ownership for efficiency seems dubious. 
Although in the simple single input - single output case, private and public companies 
may differ systematically only with respect to scale of production, in a multi input – 
multi output case the two categories of companies may also differ systematically 
regarding their composition of both outputs and inputs (in addition to scale of 
production).  
 
The problem of clustering is of course only a potential problem. Regarding the 
comparison of private and public companies however, it may very well turn out to be 
a real problem for at least two reasons. Firstly, private and public companies may be 
expected to have divergent superior objectives possibly affecting their choice of scale 
of production or the composition of outputs or inputs. For instance, if the public 
authorities are concerned with unemployment, public companies may be more staff 
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intensive than private companies solely concerned with maximising profits. Secondly, 
if the property rights theory is correct, managers of and employees in public 
companies will pursue their own personal goals to a larger extent then their 
counterparts in private companies. Several hypothesis have been put forward that may 
lead to systematic differences between public and private companies regarding the 
composition of inputs and outputs and the scale of production. For instance, 
Williamson (1964), De Alessi (1969) and Weatherby jr. (1971) argue that managers 
may have preferences for specific inputs (although they do not agree whether 
managers prefer capital intensive or labour intensive production) while Baumol 
(1959) and Niskanen (1971) argue that managers may have preferences for the size of 
their company.5 Thus, one may expect private and public companies to differ 
regarding the scale of production and the composition of inputs and outputs. 
Consequently, we are in need of a method that detects clustering in order to make 
proper evaluations of the relative efficiency of private and public companies. This is 
the subject in the subsequent section. 
 
5 Obtaining a proper subset of companies for cross-group evaluations of 
efficiency 
 
The problem of clustering is a genuine data problem. Thus, if private and public 
companies are clustered in separate subspaces in the input-output space, the data does 
not permit a proper evaluation of the relative efficiency of the two categories of 
ownership. Although some clustering may be present, it may not be complete 
however, thus permitting comparisons to be undertaken on a subset of companies. 
More specifically, in Sunde (2001) it is suggested that a study comparing two 
categories of companies should include those companies that are found to be either 
efficient or inefficient as compared to at least one company in the opposite category. 
According to Sunde (2001), those companies that are technically inefficient as 
compared to at least one company in the opposite category, may be singled out by 
means of the following inclusion rule: 
                                                          
5 One should also be aware of Migue & Belanger (1974) arguing that employees may have preferences 
for a "quiet life", leading to excess use of inputs and hence a technical inefficient production. However, 
this has a ‘neutral’ effect with regard to the composition of inputs and outputs and the scale of 
production. 
 
 Inclusion rule number 1: For each company in category J, construct a non-parametric 
frontier based on data for that company and all companies in the opposite category –J. 
Include those companies in category j obtaining an efficiency score unequal to unity. 
 
The first inclusion rule simply involves evaluating each individual company against 
the companies in the opposite category. This may be illustrated by means of figure 3 
where A, B and C are public companies while D, E and F are private companies. 
Consider the evaluation of the private companies relative to the public companies. 
According to inclusion rule number one, this involves the construction of a DEA 
frontier for each individual company based on data for that particular company and all 
public companies. In our case, we obtain DEAD, DEAE and DEAF for the private 
companies D, E and F respectively. As can be seen, both E and F are located on their 
respective frontiers, thus being best practice efficient, obtaining an efficiency score 
equal to unity. This means that neither E nor F are inefficient as compared to any of 
the public companies. However, D is located off its corresponding frontier, thus being 
inefficient, obtaining an input-saving efficiency score less than unity or an output-
increasing efficiency score exceeding unity. As a consequence, the private company D 
should be included. A similar procedure undertaken for the public companies will 
reveal that the public company C should be included. 
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Figure 3 
 
Now consider the detection of those companies that are technically efficient as 
compared to at least one company in the opposite category. From the definition of 
efficiency (Koopmans, 1951), it follows that if a company is to efficient as compared 
to a second company, then it must be possible to increase at least one output and/or 
decrease at least one input without simultaneously being forced to reduce at least one 
other output and/or increasing at least one other input. This calls for the construction 
of an ‘inverse’ DEA frontier enveloping the data from beneath rather than from above 
where the area north-west of the frontier contains those companies that are efficient. 
In figure 4, we have illustrated three such ‘inverse’ frontiers denoted by DEAD-1, 
DEAE-1 and DEAF-1 based on data for the public companies and the private companies 
D, E and F respectively.  
 
Figure 4 
 
As can be seen, both D and F are located on their respective ‘inverse’ frontiers while 
E is located off its corresponding ‘inverse’ frontier. This means that only E is 
technically efficient as compared to at least one public company and should therefore 
be included according to Sunde (2001). In Sunde (2001) it is argued that such 
‘inverse’ frontiers are straightforwardly obtained if inputs are substituted for outputs 
and vice versa. Further, it is argued that those companies that are technically efficient 
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as compared to at least one company in the opposite category, may be singled out by 
means of the following inclusion rule: 
 
Inclusion rule number 2: For each company in category j, construct a non-parametric 
frontier based on data for that company and all companies in the opposite category –J 
where inputs are treated as outputs and vice versa. Include those companies of 
category j obtaining an efficiency score unequal to unity. 
 
Consequently, those companies that fails to survive neither of the two inclusion rules 
should be censored from the data set prior to making comparisons of the relative 
efficiency of private and public companies. Such a censoring may affect the results in 
two ways (Sunde, 2001). Firstly, as censoring necessarily implies that less companies 
are included in the study, statistical results may become less robust. Secondly, 
censoring may affect the efficiency scores for at least some of the individual 
companies. 
 
6 The Data 
 
DEA has previously been applied to the Norwegian bus industry by Odeck & Alkadi 
(forthcoming) in order to test for the importance of ownership for efficiency amongst 
others. In order to make the results in our study comparable to those of Odeck & 
Alkadi (forthcoming), we apply the same data set. 
 
The data are obtained from the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for the 
year 1994. The database consists of data for 171 bus companies. However, quite a 
substantial share of the companies are very small companies whose main activities are 
school and/or charter transport. Also, some of the companies are also involved in sea 
and goods transport as well as public passenger transport by bus. In order to make 
sure that the companies are comparable, these bus companies where excluded from 
the data set, leaving us with 47 bus companies. Although these companies constitutes 
a rather modest share (about 27%) of the total number of bus companies, they are 
producing a major share (about 75%) of the total number of seat kilometers. 
 
A study of the bus industry should include at least the major inputs and outputs 
associated with public transport. Essential inputs are buses, labour, fuel and various 
equipment (eg. tyres). All these inputs are obtainable from the CBS. As buses may 
vary in size, buses are measured in terms of the total number of seats. Labour is 
divided into drivers and staff, the latter reflecting both management and operational 
personnel excluding drivers. As wages differ among companies, drivers and staff is 
measured in terms of driving hours and the number of employees respectively. As the 
same holds for fuel, fuel is measured in litres. Equipment is a composite of various 
equipment and is thus measured in monetary terms.  
 
The choice of outputs is however a highly controversial issue in the literature dealing 
with the measurement of efficiency in the bus industry; see for instance De Borger & 
Kerstens (2000). Several alternative output measures have been proposed and applied, 
amongst which seat kilometers and passenger kilometers are most common, the 
former being related to supply while the latter being related to demand. As DEA 
readily accommodates multiple outputs however, this problem may be side-stepped by 
simply including both measures of output which are available from the CBS. This is 
in line with Odeck & Alkadi (forthcomming) 6 Summary statistics for the outputs and 
inputs for the uncensored (original) data set is given in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for uncensored data 
Inputs Outputs  
Fuel Equip.* Staff Driving 
Hours 
Seats Seat  
Km** 
Pass. 
Km** 
Total 51135 205084 1390 7340163 143353 7568792 1605421
Min 165 464 2 17395 133 16347 2399 
Average 1088 4364 30 156174 3050 161038 34158 
Max 2920 16463 141 532581 15750 586045 124596 
SD 715 3391 25 124641 2496 135659 28656 
* In 1000 NOK 
** In 1000 km 
 
 
By applying the procedure described in section 5, we revealed 15 bus companies that 
should be censored from the data set of which 5 where public and the remaining 10 
where private. This left us with 16 public companies and 16 private companies, a total 
of 32 companies. In other words, 68% of the companies in the original data set where 
found to be sufficiently similar to companies of the opposite category so as to be 
included in the study. Summary statistics for the outputs and inputs for the censored 
data set is given in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for censored data 
Inputs Outputs  
Fuel Equip.* Staff Driving 
Hours 
Seats Seat  
Km** 
Pass. 
km** 
Total 36831 151476 1069 5433547 104952 5553252 1153138
Min 165 464 4 17395 133 16347 2399 
Average 1150 4734 33 169798 3280 173539 36036 
Max 2920 16463 141 532581 15750 586045 124596 
SD 762 3663 29 138209 2843 148278 31504 
* In 1000 NOK 
** In 1000 km 
 
7 Empirical results 
 
As both Odeck & Alkadi (forthcomming) and Jørgensen et al (1995) have rejected the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in the Norwegian bus industry, we applied the 
variable returns to scale model.7 Both input-saving and output-increasing measures of 
efficiency were obtained by solving (3.1) – (3.5) and (3.6) – (3.10) respectively for 
each individual company for both the censored and the uncensored data set. The 
summary results are presented for public bus companies, private bus companies and 
the pool of both public and private bus companies in tables 3,4 and 5 respectively. 
Column 1 and 4 presents the summary results for the efficiency scores obtained from 
the uncensored data set for the input-saving and output-increasing model respectively.  
Column 3 and 6 presents the corresponding summary results for the efficiency scores 
obtained from the censored data set. In addition, column 2 and 5 presents the 
summary results for the efficiency scores obtained from the uncensored data set, but 
censored for the companies found to be excluded in the previous section. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 It should be noted that passenger kilometers are highly correlated with seat kilometers. 
7 More specifically, Odeck & Alkadi (forthcomming) and Jørgensen et al (1995) have rejected constant 
returns to scale for small companies. 
Table 3: Summary results – Public Bus Companies  
Input-saving Output-increasing  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Min 0,55 0,55 0,59 1 1 1 
Mean 0,88 0,84 0,89 1,21 1,27 1,20 
Median 0,95 0,90 0,99 1,05 1,12 1,01 
Max 1 1 1 1,89 1,89 1,57 
SD 0,16 0,17 0,14 0,28 0,31 0,25 
No. of efficient units 9 6 8 9 6 8 
No. of units 21 16 16 21 16 16 
 
Table 4: Summary results – Private Bus Companies 
Input-saving Output-increasing  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Min 0,58 0,58 0,61 1 1 1 
Mean 0,81 0,76 0,84 1,29 1,38 1,23 
Median 0,78 0,77 0,82 1,33 1,36 1,17 
Max 1 1 1 1,76 1,76 1,69 
SD 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,25 0,25 0,24 
No. of efficient units 8 3 4 8 3 4 
No. of units 26 16 16 26 16 16 
 
Table 5: Summary results – Pooled  
Input-saving Output-increasing  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Min 0,55 0,55 0,59 1 1 1 
Mean 0,84 0,80 0,86 1,25 1,32 1,21 
Median 0,87 0,79 0,86 1,18 1,33 1,12 
Max 1 1 1 1,89 1,89 1,69 
SD 0,16 0,16 0,14 0,27 0,28 0,24 
No. of efficient units 17 9 12 17 9 12 
No. of units 47 32 32 47 32 32 
 
First, consider the importance of censoring for the efficiency scores. Recall that a total 
of 15 companies have been censored from the data set. Further, recall that this may 
affect not only the statistical robustness of the study, but possibly also the efficiency 
scores of at least some of the companies. By comparing models 2 and 3 and models 5 
and 6 respectively, we can infer from table 2 that mean efficiency scores for both 
private and public companies are improved by censoring, a finding that is hardly 
surprising. Concerning the influence on individual efficiency scores however, the 
correlation coefficients are found to be 0,88 and 0,84 for the input-saving and the 
output-increasing models respectively. 
 Now we turn to the main issue being the importance of ownership. By comparing the 
mean efficiency scores reported in tables 3 and 4, we note that private companies 
seems to be somewhat less efficient than their public counterparts, a finding that 
counters the property rights hypothesis. In order to test whether this difference is 
significant however, we apply the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (or Wilcoxon) rank 
test in order to infer whether two groups have identical populations or not. This is 
obtained by the following procedure: 
 
1. Split the efficiency scores in the two groups that are to be compared. 
2. Pool the groups and rank in increasing order of magnitude. 
3. Calculate the rank sum S of the first group 
 
The distribution of the rank sum statistic S is approximately normal with mean m(m + 
n + 1)/2 and variance mn(m + n + 1)/12 where m is the number of observations in the 
first group and n is the number of observations in the second group. By normalising S, 
we obtain the test statistics: 
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The rejection region for the Z statistics can be determined by using the standard 
normal distribution. More specifically, we reject the hypothesis that the two groups 
have the same population if Z is less than minus Zα/2 or greater than Zα/2 where α is 
the level of significance. The results of the various Mann-Whitney tests undertaken in 
this study are reported in table 6.  
 
Table 6: Summary of Mann-Whitney tests 
Input-saving Output-increasing  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ownership -1,393 
(0,164) 
-1,296 
(0,195) 
-1,201 
(0,230) 
-0,921 
(0,357) 
-1,048 
(0,294) 
-0,910 
(0,363) 
 
For a level of significance of α = 0,05 (5%), we obtain Z0,025 = 1,96. Thus, unless test 
statistics exceeds 1,96 or falls below –1,96, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that 
the efficiency scores for private and public companies come from the same sample.  
As can be seen, none of the test statistics falls outside this interval. This goes for both 
the censored and the uncensored (original) data set. Thus, we must conclude that 
censoring the data set as suggested in Sunde (2001) does not seem to have any 
significant effect on the findings in this case. Further, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the efficiency scores for private and public companies come from the 
same sample. Consequently, we conclude that ownership seems to have no significant 
effect on efficiency. This finding is in line with several of the more recent DEA 
studies of the bus industry dealing with the importance of ownership for efficiency, 
amongst others Odeck & Alkadi (forthcoming) applying DEA on the data set used in 
this study. 
 
8 Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this paper has been to throw some further light on the significance of 
ownership for efficiency, both in general and for the bus industry in particular. The 
motivation for this study has been twofold. Firstly, although several studies have been 
undertaken, the literature is inconclusive. Secondly and more importantly, most of the 
recent studies apply DEA without making sure that private and public companies are 
sufficiently similar to be comparable by means of DEA. More specifically, several 
hypothesis have been put forward that if the property rights theory is correct, then we 
may expect private and public companies to differ systematically regarding their scale 
of production and/or their composition of inputs and outputs. This being the case, 
private and public companies will tend to be clustered in separate subspaces in the 
input-output space. As DEA is acclaimed for being a flexible tool for efficiency 
measurement, letting the data reveal the possibly complex relationship between inputs 
and outputs, each company is most likely to be evaluated to similar companies being 
located in the ‘neighbourhood’ in the production possibility space. As a consequence, 
clustering will imply that most companies will be evaluated against companies in their 
own category rather than the opposite category. In order to avoid this pitfall, we have 
applied a method that allows us to reveal those private and public companies that are 
comparable and consequently should be included in a DEA study. The method has 
been applied on a sample of 47 Norwegian bus companies of which 15 where 
censored due to being too dissimilar to be included in a test of the property rights 
theory.  
 
Based on the censored data set, input-saving efficiency measures where obtained for 
each and every company. The property rights theory was tested by means of non-
parametric Mann-Whitney rank tests. Albeit public bus companies turned out to be 
more efficient than their private counterparts on average, a finding contradicting the 
property rights hypothesis, the difference is quite small and statistically insignificant. 
Thus, our study does not support the property rights hypothesis that private ownership 
is superior to public ownership. This is a finding in line with several of the more 
recent studies applying DEA on the bus industry. 
 
Efficiency scores were also obtained for the uncensored data. As for the censored data 
set, ownership had no significant influence on average efficiency. Thus, the censoring 
seems to have had no (or at least minor) effect on the results. This is not to say that 
censoring might be unimportant when evaluating the relative efficiency of private and 
public companies in other industries. We can think of several reasons for this. For 
instance, in the Norwegian bus industry output is determined by the local authorities 
and not left to the discretion of the companies. As a consequence, the companies are 
not free to escalate the scale of their production. Further, there are quite small 
possibilities of substitution in the bus industry (Berechman, 1993) so that the 
managers in the bus industry lacks the opportunity to pursue their desire for specific 
inputs. Thus, in other industries where output is less regulated and possibilities of 
substitution more significant, censoring may turn out to be of major importance. 
 
It should be noted that although censoring enables one to control for the possibility 
that private and public companies are too dissimilar to be compared by means of 
DEA, several unresolved issues remain. A fundamental issue is causality, that is 
whether ownership affects efficiency or the other way round (that is, efficiency affects 
ownership). 
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